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ABSTRACT
Spectrum is an essential resource for the provision of mobile ser-
vices. In order to control and delimit its use, governmental agen-
cies set up regulatory policies. Unfortunately, such policies have
led to a deficiency of spectrum as only few frequency bands are left
unlicensed, and these are used for the majority of new emerging
wireless applications. One promising way to alleviate the spectrum
shortage problem is adopting a spectrum sharing paradigm in which
frequency bands are used opportunistically. Cognitive radio is the
key technology to enable this shift of paradigm.
Cognitive radio networks are self-organized systems in which de-
vices cooperate to use those spectrum ranges that are not occupied
by licensed users. They carry out spectrum sensing in order to de-
tect vacant channels that can be used for communication. Even
though spectrum sensing is an active area of research, an impor-
tant issue remains unsolved: the secure authentication of sensing
reports. Not providing security enables the input of false data in
the system thus empowering false results. This paper presents a
distributed protocol based on wireless physical layer security, sym-
metric cryptography and one-way functions that allows determin-
ing a final sensing decision from multiple sources in a quick and
secure way, as well as it preserves users’ privacy.
Keywords
authentication, cognitive radio, cooperative sensing, privacy, wire-
less physical layer security
1. INTRODUCTION
The inherent demand for wireless services has led to an increased
demand for radio spectrum. The necessary sharing of this finite
resource has traditionally been regulated using fixed spectrum as-
signment policies by governmental agencies. This means that regu-
latory agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), allocate spectrum for particular types of services on a long
term basis. The problem of this assignment policy is that it has led
to a considerable inefficiency in spectrum utilization. Studies con-
ducted by the Spectrum Policy Task Force show that most of the
licensed spectrum is largely under-utilized [5].
One promising way to alleviate the spectrum shortage problem is
adopting a spectrum sharing paradigm in which frequency bands
are used opportunistically. In this scheme, those who own the li-
cense to use the spectrum are referred to as primary users, and
those who access the spectrum opportunistically are referred to as
secondary users. Secondary users must not interfere with primary
ones, who always have usage priority.
The enabling technology for opportunistic sharing is cognitive ra-
dio (CR) [10]. A CR is a system that senses its electromagnetic
environment and can dynamically and autonomously adjust its op-
erating parameters to access the spectrum. CR terminals form self-
organizing networks capable to detect vacant spectrum bands that
can be used without harmful interference with primary users. Once
a vacant band is found, secondary users coordinate themselves in
order to share the available spectrum.
Performing reliable spectrum sensing is a difficult task. Wireless
channels can suffer fading, thus causing the hidden node problem
in which a secondary user fails to detect a primary transmitter. The
most important challenge for a CR is to identify the presence of
primary users, and, for this reason, secondary users must be sig-
nificantly more sensitive in detecting primary transmissions than
primary receivers.
To increase the spectrum accuracy without increasing the hardware
complexity cooperative and distributed sensing approaches (DSS)
have been proposed as discussed in [9, 20]. In DSS, multiple sec-
ondary users cooperate and share their local sensing results, which
are then merged together to reach a final decision. Several data
fusion schemes have been proposed to merge the sensing data ob-
served by each secondary user [1, 19, 15]. In order to correctly
balance the contributions of the users and ensure a reliable data fu-
sion, these protocols try to characterize the users, learn how they
behave and at which extend they shall be trusted, using either prob-
abilistic or reputation models.
However, in order to effectively track users, the sensing contribu-
tions that they make must be authenticated. Some proposals have
been presented to authenticate users’ spectrum decisions [6, 4, 13].
Yet, they introduce a notable overhead in the network since the
initialization phase of the protocols is based on public key cryp-
tography, and the sensing phase requires several cryptographic op-
erations and/or explicit time delays. Moreover, they are not pri-
vacy sensitive. Privacy is becoming increasingly important with
the dawn of the Internet and it is one of the main criticisms of the
ubiquitous computing technologies, like cognitive radio networks.
Privacy can be defined as "‘the claim of individuals, groups or insti-
tutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others"’ [17]. Network
protocols should not spread information about a user without his
consent, and they shall be designed so that this information is not
mandatory.
Wireless networks are specially sensitive to privacy problems be-
cause of their broadcast nature. Today’s secure cooperative sensing
protocols require that users be authenticated using a public key and
an identity certificate. This entails that both the manager of the net-
work and the users in the near zone, know the location of the sender,
her connectivity profile, with whom she tends to communicate, etc.
Citizens may be concerned that they are constantly being watched,
surveilled, and that their personal details and situation can get in
the wrong hands and be exploited by unwanted or even criminal
people.
This paper overcomes the problems of past proposals designing a
cross-layer solution exclusively based on light symmetric key cryp-
tography and providing a protocol that is robust against identity and
location disclosure attacks offering privacy protection measures.
The paper is organized as follows. An overview of the goals and the
structure of the protocol is provided in section 2. The steps of the
secure and anonymous cooperative sensing protocol are presented
in section 3. The security and cost of the protocol are analysed in
section 4. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
2. OVERVIEW
In order to perform distributed sensing securely, the cooperative
system should identify the users that participate in the sensing pro-
cess, authenticate their claims, and weigh up their contribution to
the final decision based on their reputation or probability of suc-
cessful detection. Our protocol focuses on the mechanisms re-
quired to identify the users, authenticate their sensing results, and
prevent them from injecting fake sensing data into the system. The
proposed protocol uses a centralized cooperation model among CR’s,
and it assumes that the secondary users and the fusion center can
use a common control channel to exchange messages.
One of the key goals of the protocol design is to develop an efficient
solution suitable for constrained devices. Therefore, the cryptogra-
phy involved in our proposal is based on simple symmetric key
algorithms.
The main challenge of symmetric key systems is how to distribute
and manage the keys among the authorized nodes. Different pro-
cessing lightweight solutions have been proposed in the scope of
ad hoc sensor networks, which pre-distribute or dynamically gen-
erate the secret keys using probabilistic approaches (see a review
in [18]). However, the cost of such schemes is high in terms of
storage and/or communication complexities, thus limiting their ap-
plicability.
Recently, another kind of proposals has emerged that exploits the
basic characteristics of the wireless physical channel to generate
information-theoretic secure keys between two parties [21, 8, 11, 7,
2]. The wireless channel is assumed to be reciprocal (i.e. the chan-
nel between two antennas is symmetrical, irrespective of the prop-
agation environment) and suffers temporal and spacial variations.
The variation over time is caused by motion and multipath fading.
Typically, the transmitted signal travels to the receiver along a mul-
titude of paths. As the various paths vary in length, the signal trans-
mitted at a particular instant will arrive at the receiver over a spread
of times, causing problems with phase distortion and intersymbol,
i.e. fading. If the transmitter, receptor, or any of the intermediate
objects that cause multipath move, the effects of fading will vary
over time. Besides, the properties of a radio channel are unique
to the locations of the two endpoints of the link. Radio channels
decorrelate over distances of the order of half a wavelength (λ).
Hence, and eavesdropper at a third location will measure a differ-
ent uncorrelated radio channel than the endpoint nodes.
Some works exploit the temporal received signal strength (RSS)
variations of a radio channel to generate the secret bits [11, 2].
Some others use the spatial selectivity [21, 8] and others, use the
frequency selectivity of multipath fading [7]. These last ones do not
require node movement and are better suited for static networks.
However they use more bandwidth (different frequency channels)
to generate the key.
In our system, the need to generate or distribute symmetric keys
occurs when a node decides to participate in a cooperative sens-
ing process. This may be motivated by two circumstances: (1) the
node moves into the coverage area of a fusion centre and is auto-
matically introduced in the sensing process, or (2) the node starts
the sensing on his own initiative because it must send some data.
In either case, the entry of the node in the network can be tied to a
certain movement: natural in the first case, or induced by the pro-
tocol in the second one. Since when a user starts the sensing on his
own initiative he is aware of that, the application can asks the user
to shake the terminal. Thus, we base the generation of the initial
secret key required for the sensing protocol on a temporal selective
wireless physical layer security protocol. In particular, we use the
method proposed by Patwari et al. [11]. Their results show that
high entropy bits can be quickly obtained when there is a signif-
icant movement in the environment and that the generated stream
passes the randomness tests of the NIST [16]. Using this scheme, a
given node and the fusion centre can initially create a secret shared
key that will be used from then on to authenticate each other.
In addition to having a group of keys to establish peer to peer con-
nections with every node in its domain, the fusion centre needs a
way to authenticate its broadcast messages. To do so, we use a
low-cost solution based on hash chains: the µ Tesla protocol [12].
Hash chains are composed of a sequence of values that can only
be computed in one direction. A hash chain of length N is con-
structed by applying a one-way hash function H(.) recursively to
an initial seed value vN : vN−1 = H(vN ), vN−2 = H(vN−1),
· · · , v0 = HN (vN ). In general, vi = H(vi+1) = HN−i(vN ).
The last element of the chain v0 is called the top value, and is in-
deed, a commitment to the entire chain. We can verify any element
of the chain through v0. The elements of the chain are revealed in
ascending order v0; v1; ..; vN so that the disclosure of an element
does not disclose any information of the next elements. In µTesla
the elements of a hash chain are used as one-time keys. As we will
see in section 3.3, each time a fusion centre has to send an authen-
ticated broadcast message, it uses one of these keys.
During the sensing process, node’s sensing reports are protected
from forgery and manipulation using a Hash Message Authentica-
tion Code (HMAC). HMAC is a fast and simple way to perform
symmetric signatures. It is based on using a hash function H over
a message m and a shared secret key k:
H(k ⊕ opad||(H((k ⊕ ipad)||m))
where ipad is the byte 0x36 repeatedB times, and opad is the byte
0x5C repeated B times, with B the byte length of the working data
blocks of the compression function involved in the hashing process.
The symbol || represents the concatenation operation.
The result of an HMAC operation has the length of the hash out-
put. Yet, in some cases, it can be truncated outputting the t left-
most bits of the HMAC computation for some parameter t, in order
to obtain a shorter value and reduce the bandwidth overhead in-
volved in its transmission. This kind of HMAC is called truncated
HMAC-t. Shorter t values increase the chance that a source with
no knowledge of the secret key can present a purported HMAC-t
on the plaintext message that will pass the verification procedure.
Therefore, t must be chosen to optimize the trade-off between se-
curity and efficiency.
2.1 Adversary Model
In our model we assume that the adversary can listen to all commu-
nications in the network. It can also measure the channels between
itself and the users of the network, and between itself and the fu-
sion centre. Further, it is free to move or stay static, and it can
be anywhere in the network except next to any network members
while they are extracting their shared key. To ensure that the ad-
versary measures a different, uncorrelated radio channel than the
users, it has to be located away, a few multiples of the wavelength
of the radio waves being used [8]. We also assume that the adver-
sary knows the physical layer key extraction algorithm, as well as
the secure and anonymous cooperative sensing protocol.
The adversary can operate at the packet, bit, or signal levels, but
cannot jam the channel; i.e., our methodology does not prevent
from denial of service attacks. However, the attacker can be ac-
tive and send data packets to other users and to the fusion centre.
3. SECURE AND ANONYMOUS SENSING
PROTOCOL
This section presents the detailed steps of our protocol for the se-
cure and anonymous authentication of users’ sensing reports. The
protocol is divided in four phases. The first phase is the registry of
users; the second one is the authentication of users that want to par-
ticipate in the sensing process; the third is the sensing assignment;
finally, the fourth is the collection of sensing results.
3.1 Phase 1: User Registry
When a user enters in a cognitive radio domain, she contacts the
fusion centre (which can be, for instance, the base station) and asks
permission to join the cognitive radio network. If she is already
registered at the fusion centre, the mutual authentication protocol
(see section 3.2) is executed. Otherwise, she registers at the fusion
centre in order to be able to use the available channels of the spec-
trum, and to collaborate (if required) in the sensing process. In the
registration phase, the user and the fusion centre agree on a key in
such a way that both influence the outcome, using a protocol based
on [11]. The agreed key will be used in subsequent encounters to
authenticate each other.
To agree on a shared key, the user and the fusion centre exploit
the fact that a particular wireless channel between two entities is
unique, varies like a stochastic process, and cannot be inferred by
external parties.
1. User U and the fusion centre FC transmit known probe sig-
nals to one another. Each party can use the received signal
along with the probe signal to compute an estimate of the
channel: the FC estimates ĥFC and U estimates ĥU .
2. From the channel estimations ĥFC and ĥU the entities de-
rive a bit stream. The bit streams generated by FC and
U are not equal due to the presence of noise and interfer-
ence in the transmission, hardware limitations, manufactur-
ing differences, and the fact that both entities do the sam-
pling in different times (a lot of commercial transceivers are
half-duplex and cannot send and receive packets at the same
time). Hence, in this step FC and U must reliably recon-
cile channel estimations without revealing any information
to an eavesdropper, since the channel characterization is the
seed for a common secret. To do so, FC and U execute
an iterative reconciliation protocol that divides the estimated
stream in blocks and sends permutation and parity informa-
tion of each block to the other party in order to find out which
blocks match and which do not.
3. Upon agreeing on a channel estimation, the bit stream must
be modified to amplify its secrecy. Some portions of the bit
stream are removed because of the revealed information in
the reconciliation step, or because subsequent bits exhibit
short-term correlations. Finally, a statistically random bit
stream is obtained.
4. The steps 1 to 3 are repeated iteratively until the shared key s
is 20 bytes long. Note that the channel is static during its co-
herence time period and thus, it can only be probed once dur-
ing this time. So, mobility of the end-points or environment
changes are desirable in order to rapidly obtain the required
bits. This can be obtained if the user simply shakes her ter-
minal. Since this phase has to be performed only once in the
lifetime of a node in a network, this issue does not negatively
effect the usability of the system.
The resulting shared key s is divided in two parts: (1) the first
8 bytes constitute a permanent value that is the user identifier:
IdU = s1−8, (2) the last 12 bytes are a secret key k that will
be periodically updated: k = s9−20. The key will be period-
ically updated in order to strengthen its security. Moreover,
the entities will compute a temporal index identifier for IdU
that will be used to conceal the user identity from eavesdrop-
pers the next time the user joins the fusion centre domain.
The temporal index is computed as:
pidU = H(IdU ||k)64
where H(a)t is the hash function over the message a trun-
cated to t bits, and || represents the concatenation function.
3.2 Phase 2: Session Authentication
When a registered user enters a cognitive radio domain, she asks
permission to the fusion centre to join the network. This process
requires mutual authentication using digital signatures. Besides,
the fusion centre commits to a hash chain using the µ Tesla proto-
col [12]. The fusion centre commits to the same hash chain V with
all users. V is generated from a random number, has N elements,
and the top value of the chain is V0.
The following are the detailed steps carried out during this phase.
1. When a user U wants to join a cognitive radio network where
she is already registered, she sends a join request to FC. The
message contains the identity of FC IdFC , an index to the
identity of the user pidU , and a challenge nonce nU gener-
ated by U .
JoinReq1 = {IdFC , pidU , nU}
2. After verifying pidU belongs to a registered user, FC de-
cides whether or not to accept U into the network. This deci-
sion will be based, for example, on the reputation earned by
U in previous processes. The implementation of these mech-
anisms is out of the scope of this paper.
If U is accepted in the network, FC uses the session key k
shared with U to sign the top value of its chain V0, the length
N and the received nonce nU with an HMAC function. This
signature is used to construct the following response:
JoinResp1 = {V0, N,HMACk(nU , V0, N)}
3. Upon receiving JoinResp1, U verifies the HMAC signature
and the freshness of the hash chain V0 (i.e. it has not been
used before). The signature allows U to verify the authen-
ticity and integrity of the received data. If the signature is
correct, U signs V0 and sends the signature to FC.
JoinReq2 = {HMACk(V0)}
4. FC authenticatesU by verifying the signature of JoinReq2.
If correct, FC updates U ’s temporal index identifier and the
key they share as follows:
k′ = H(k||nU ||V0)
pid′U = H(IdU ||k′)64
k′ and pid′U will be used the next time U starts an authenti-
cation session with FC. If the authentication is successful,
FC sends an acknowledge message to the user.
5. U updates her next index and shared key performing the
same computations as FC.
3.3 Phase 3: Sensing Assignment
In the Sensing Assignment phase, the fusion centre requests the
active users of the domain to sense a certain set of frequency bands.
To do so, it sends a signed broadcast message. The signing key is
an element of the hash chain it has committed to in the Session
Authentication phase (see section 3.2). Users will not be able to
verify the message until the fusion centre reveals the signing key,
which will do after ∆ t. ∆ t is a period of time designated by the
fusion centre as the sensing interval. The fusion centre expects
sensing reports from the users every ∆ t seconds.
The following are the detailed steps carried out during the Sensing
Assignment phase:
1. At time t0, FC splits the time into equal length intervals
∆ t and broadcasts a signed message containing the schedule
they will use in the sensing process, the list of channels that
have to be sensed (ChList), and a mode parameter with de-
tailed information about the sensing mode: hard cooperation,
soft cooperation based on energy detection, soft cooperation
based on cyclostationary feature detection, etc.
SensReqt0 = {IdFC , Ids, ChList,mode, t0,∆ t,
HMACVIds (IdFC , Ids, ChList,mode, t0,∆ t)}
where
ChList = [ Ch0, Ch1, · · ·Chk ]
In the above expression, Ids is a session counter; it is incre-
mented by one unit each time the fusion centre broadcasts a
sensing request. The key used to sign the message is VIds ,
i.e. an element of the fusion centre hash chain. The fusion
centre will reveal its value at time t0 + ∆ t.
2. U verifies the signature of the sensing request and, if correct,
starts the sensing process.
3.4 Phase 4: Collection of Local Sensing Re-
sults
Users sense the spectrum and send their results to the fusion centre
using an HMAC signature. The key k used to compute the HMAC
signature is the one associated with the current time frame. The
following are the detailed steps carried out in this phase.
1. U senses the channels listed in ChList and sends the results
SensRes to FC. These results can be binary decisions, long
test statistics, or data captured in the sensing. This depends
on whether hard or soft cooperation is employed. To enable
the authentication of the sensing results, these are sent as fol-
lows:
SignRest = {pidU , SensRest, t,
HMACk(pidU , SensRest, t)}
SignRest includes the present time t to avoid replay attacks.
The key K used to construct the HMAC signature is the one
that U and FC share for the present session.
2. FC receives the sensing results and verifies their authenticity
and integrity using the key shared with each user.
4. DISCUSSION
The proposed protocol allows the authentication of sensing reports
with a minimum overhead. Users do not need to hold a public key
certificate or some predefined shared keys in order to enter in the
system. They can register at the fusion centre on-line using the in-
trinsic security of the wireless physical channel. In order to become
members of the CRN, the disclosure of personal information to the
fusion centre is not required. Users are only identified by a unique
ID and they share a symmetric key with the fusion centre.
The simplicity of the registration process allows the CRN to com-
prise a large number of users. The only drawback of the proposed
scheme is that the system is not inherently robust against Sybil at-
tacks. This means that a user can have as many identities as she
likes, and thus the tracking of malicious users (who use a different
identity every time) can be difficult. To solve this problem, the rep-
utation mechanisms of the fusion centre should be designed in such
a way that a user cannot have a great weight in the final decision
unless she has been a good member for a long time. The confidence
in new users should always be prudent in order to keep the risk of
attacks under control.
In order to protect the privacy of CRN users, they identify them-
selves to the system using an index that changes in every session.
This index is derived from the ID of the user and the key shared
with the fusion centre (which also changes in every session). Since
none of these parameters is revealed during a session, an attacker
eavesdropping the packets of a CRN cannot deduce the new in-
dexes of the network members. Therefore, attackers cannot track
or discover any private user information, and thus their profile and
location remains protected.
The unforgeability of the keys and identities that are used in the
protocol is guaranteed as we can assume that the hash functions
used in the protocol are collision resistant. The initial key of the
protocol is 96 bits long, which is considered long enough based on
the the NIST security guidelines [3].
One of the benefit of the protocol is its efficiency. Table 1 depicts a
summary of the temporal costs of the protocol in each of its stages.
The cryptographic costs in the table display the time that a cogni-
tive radio user would spend processing the cryptographic parts of
the protocol. We assume clients hold an embedded ARM device
at 624MHz, and their costs are based on Rifà-Pous et al. study
[14]. The transmission costs in the table are computed assuming a
802.11b network at 11Mbps.
Phases Crypto Comput. Transmission costs
1. Registry 5.02µs ≈ 7.28s
2. Session Authent. 30.12µs 697.45µs
3. Sensing Assign. 10.04µs 245.82µs
4. Sensing Results 10.04µs 245.82µs
Table 1: Performance analysis of the proposed protocol
Phase 1 has to be executed only once. To generate the key we need
to take measurements of the RSS (received signal strength) when
this takes abnormal values due to the context variations. We assume
that the generation of the secret key is produced in a fast changing
environment (e.g. by the shaking of the terminal) and that two RSS
measurements can be taken in each wavelength of the radio signal.
The experiments carried out in [11] show that the secret bit rate in
a scenario where one of the terminals is in movement is around 22
bits/s. Thus, obtaining a shared key of 20 bytes requires around
7,273s.
In phase 1, the user also has to compute a hash function to ob-
tain her pidU . Using a SHA-1 algorithm, the computational cost is
5.02µs.
This first stage of the protocol is really costly. However, it has to
be compared with the registration phases of other systems. For ex-
ample, in a public key infrastructure (PKI), users need to contact
to a third entity and generate a pair of keys, a resource consum-
ing operation that may not be available in a low-end mobile device.
Contrary, the generation of a shared key using the physical proper-
ties of the channel can be carried out by any device. It takes time,
but it is easy to execute and convenient.
Phase 2 is executed each time a user enters the cognitive radio net-
work. The user and the FC interchange 3 messages: JoinReq1,
JoinResp1 and JoinReq2. The packet transmission time Tpacket
over a 802.11b control channel is expressed as follows:
Tpacket = TPhyHdr + (MMacHdr +MPayload)/11Mbps
where TPhyHdr is the PLCP (Physical Layer Convergence Proce-
dure) preamble and header. The physical control data is 24 bytes
long and it is transmitted at 1Mbps, so TPhyHdr = 192µs. MMacHdr
is the length of layer 2 headers, which for an ad-hoc connection is
24 bytes. MPayload is the protocol data length. Both MMacHdr
and MPayload are transmitted at 11Mbps. The length of the mes-
sages transmitted in this phase of the protocol (JoinReq1, JoinResp1
and JoinReq2) is approximated by 30, 45, and 20 bytes respec-
tively. Then, the total transmission time in this phase is 697.45µs.
Besides, in phase 2 the user has to verify 1 HMAC signature, gen-
erate another HMAC, and compute two hashes to update its secret
data. In total, 6 hash operations. Using SHA-1, the total computa-
tional cost is 30.12µs.
In phase 3, a user receives a sensing assignment. The verification of
the message signature costs 10.04µs, and the transmission of this
message (which is assumed to be 50 bytes long) takes 245.82µs.
Finally, in phase 4 the user has to build the sensing reports. This
phase will be repeated periodically every 2 seconds at a maximum
(2 seconds is the maximum time allowed by the cognitive radio
standard for Wireless Regional Area Networks -WRAN- to detect
a new incumbent signal in the network) so it has to be very effi-
cient. The user only needs to compute an HMAC for each report
(so, a cost of 10.04µs). Regarding the transmission, we assume the
cooperative model of the network is based on soft-decision, and the
sensing reports of the users have a total of 30 bytes of data. If this
data is signed using a HMAC based on SHA-1, the total size of the
message is 50 bytes (20 bytes of overhead). The total transmission
time of the sensing report is 245.82µs.
The cost analysis indicates that, except for the phase 1, both the
cryptographic costs of the protocol as well as the transmission ones
are very limited. Phase 1 introduces a considerable delay, but is
only executed once for each cognitive radio network the users wants
to join. From the other phases, the most resource consuming one is
the second, which is ran once in each session.
The presented protocol can be compared with the two general pur-
pose secure sensing protocols proposed by Jakimoski et al. [6] and
Ersöz et al. [4].
Jakimoski uses a public key scheme to authenticate the users and, in
the same way that in our proposal, it uses an HMAC based method
to authenticate the sensing reports of the users in each round. The
weak point of the protocol is that the keys used to compute the
HMAC are unknown by the destination of the message (the fusion
centre) and must be sent by the network some stipulated time af-
ter sending the HMAC. This feature introduces a notable delay in
taking a final decision about the occupancy of a channel.
In contrast, Ersöz proposal authenticates the sensing reports using
symmetric key encryption and HMACs. For each sensing report
each user has to compute an encryption and an HMAC. Although
the costs of the proposal are quite restricted, our scheme is even
lighter (it only requires an HMAC). On the other hand, the key
management structure or Ersöz proposal is based on a Logical Key
Hierarchy (LKH) architecture in which users share a common key
that has to be changed and re-distributed when the group of cog-
nitive radio nodes is modified. This can present high management
costs in quite dynamic networks.
5. CONCLUSION
Cooperative sensing protocols are vulnerable to malicious attacks
that can result in erroneous decisions: the failure to recognize pri-
mary users signals and thus provoke inconvenient interferences; the
mistake to consider a channel is occupied and can not be used for
CR users; or simply making an unfair distribution of the encoun-
tered free spectrum.
In this paper, we have identified the security vulnerabilities of a
cooperative sensing process and its prejudicial effects on CR net-
works. We have proposed a secure protocol for centralized based
systems that essentially uses symmetric signatures and one-way
chains. The protocol allows the fusion centre to verify the authen-
ticity of network members and to ensure that the received sensing
information was really originated from the claimed source. At the
same time, the protocol guarantees the anonymity of participating
nodes and is robust against location disclosure attacks. One of the
main features of the proposal is the fact that is computationally ef-
ficient and introduces a small bandwidth overhead.
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